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Abstract.  In a comparative institutional or ‘variety of capitalism’ perspective, the distinctive traits of 
labor markets in Latin America differ in most respects from labor markets in developed countries. 
Moreover, there are strong economic complementarities among five core features of labor markets in 
Latin America:  low skill levels, high labor regulation, short job tenure, a large informal sector, and 
small, politicized unions that lack plant level representation.  While numerous and strong, economic 
complementarities among these five components do not tell the whole story, and we analyze additional 
political complementarities.  This integrated perspective on the economic and political interactions 
helps explain continuities in labor markets in Latin America and their disappointing response in recent 
decades to market reform and globalization.
2I.  Introduction:  Sources of Continuity
Observers of labor markets in Latin America generally agree that performance in recent 
decades was disappointing, for some in fact, “perhaps the greatest disappointment of the new 
development strategy” (Berg et al. 2006: 1; Pagés et al. 2009: 1).  This disappointment is not 
restricted to social scientists, as public opinion surveys “have identified unemployment, low 
wages, and job instability as the most pressing problems in the region...” (IDB 2003: 1). 
However, beyond this general consensus, the diagnoses, and resulting policy prescriptions, vary 
greatly.  For the International Labour Organization, for example, a core problem is informality, 
which accounts for about half of all employment and half of the new jobs created in the 2000s. 
A central policy recommendation is therefore for more and better enforcement as well as “social 
dialogue” among representatives of workers, employers, and the government (ILO 2006: 12, 19; 
see also IDB 2003: 118, 277).  Others in contrast blame rigidity and overregulation and its 
“many undesirable side effects,” and call for deregulation and more flexibility (World Bank 
2004b: 35, 37-8).
Another group focuses on comparatively low levels of education and skills.  These 
studies usually recommend greater investment in education as well as additional policies to 
reform training institutes (IDB 2003: 276), to expose firms to greater competition (de Ferranti et 
al 2003: 9), or promote diffusion of information on the high returns to education (Menezes-Filho 
2003: 143).  Returns to education have been a central concern of scholars who analyze how 
recent shifts in labor markets have tended to exacerbate already high levels of inequality, both 
because wages of skilled workers have risen relative to wages of unskilled workers and because 
the returns to education are higher for rich students than for poor students (Perry et al. 2005, di 
3Gropello 2006: 76-7).  Policy prescriptions tend to emphasize reducing obstacles and enhancing 
access to secondary, post-secondary, and vocational education.
The case for each of these proposed reforms is compelling, but individually their impact 
is likely to be muted unless they take into account the broader interactions among core aspects of 
labor markets.  Expanding programs in vocational education, for example, is designed to raise 
skill levels in the workforce.  However, the usefulness of these skills and the incentives of 
workers to invest time in acquiring them depend on the likelihood of remaining in jobs that 
require these skills, a condition that is difficult to meet in labor markets in Latin America where 
median job tenure is only three years.  This low tenure rate in turn is associated in part with high 
regulation and a large informal sector.  In other words, the effectiveness of training depends on a 
range of other factors beyond the actual training programs themselves.
To map out a more encompassing analysis of the major components of labor markets we 
focus on five core features – high labor market regulation, low skill levels, high turnover, weak 
unions, and high informality – that distinguish labor markets in Latin America from labor 
markets in most other regions.  In addition to highlighting these distinctive components, we also 
examine the reinforcing interactions among them.  Other scholars have looked at some of these 
connections, but none have put together all these pieces.  Particularly turnover, and the negative 
effects of high turnover for human capital and social dialogue, has received little attention.  In 
fact, to the extent researchers look at turnover it is often viewed in positive terms as an indicator 
of rapid adjustment to changing market opportunities (see World Bank 2004a, chapter 7).
Political factors also reinforce some of these economic interactions.  Political contention 
over issues like informality, high employment protection, or low skills, cannot be fully 
4understood in isolation from one another.  Moreover, understanding these interactions helps flesh 
out the politics of labor market regulation by adding to the analysis of the active support for the 
status quo an understanding of the weakness of potential sources of support for would-be 
reformers.  So, for example, the potential coalition for reforming the informal sector (forcing 
more workers onto the books) is weak in part because the informal sector does not threaten 
existing unions, provides a default safety net for workers who are laid off on a regular basis, and 
offers employers ways to circumvent costly regulations.
Generally speaking the large literatures on labor politics, on the one hand, and on labor 
markets, on the other, do not engage each other much.  Political analyses focus primarily on 
unions (organization, leadership, strategies, etc.) and their relations with states and parties to the 
relative neglect labor markets (Murillo 2001; Cook 2007).  Economic analyses of labor markets 
in turn incorporate politics only rarely and then in fairly mechanical fashion (e.g., insiders seek 
and defend exclusive privileges) (IDB 2003).  Hence, a second goal of ours is to integrate better 
politics and economics and combine, where relevant, insights from both literatures.
Our last, and primary, goal is to contribute to the debate on what went wrong in labor 
markets in Latin America.  Why has the response to market reform and globalization been so 
disappointing in terms of the quality of jobs generated, what a recent World Bank study calls 
“growthless jobs” (Pagés et al. 2009: 2)?  We draw on the multiple interactions and 
complementarities to show how they mostly tend to reinforce the suboptimal status quo. 
Admittedly, the last decades have seen substantial changes on some of the core dimensions we 
analyze, yet these are still the dimensions that most differentiate Latin America, especially when 
adjusted for income levels, from other regions, both developed and developing.  In this 
5comparative perspective, it is this relative continuity that requires explanation, and where our 
focus on complementarities and reinforcing dynamics has the most to offer.
Our framework draws general inspiration from the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach. 
Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) distinguish between “liberal market economies” (LMEs, 
including the United States, Great Britain, and its other settler colonies) and “coordinated market 
economies” (CMEs, including most countries in northern Europe and Japan).  LMEs and CMEs 
have distinctive strengths and weaknesses that derive from the different organization of capital 
markets, labor markets, education and skills, inter-firm relations, and labor relations, as well as 
the complementarities among these core institutions of capitalism.  While we hope to show that 
Latin American labor markets do have important commonalities, our goal in this paper is not to 
establish a Latin American variety of capitalism.   Such a study would need to incorporate the 
wider range of economic institutions in the original framework (see, for example, Xxxx 2009). 
Moreover, the patterns we document here may also exist in similar forms in other developing and 
transition economics, so the interactions and complementarities we identify are not exclusively 
Latin American (Batt et al. 2009; Piore and Schrank 2008).
Section II elaborates on the distinctive traits of labor markets in Latin America and 
briefly catalogs how labor markets in Latin America differ in most respects from both LMEs and 
CMEs.  Section III turns to an examination of the complementarities among the five core 
features of labor markets in Latin America:  low skill levels, high labor regulation, short job 
tenure, a large informal sector, and small, politicized unions that lack plant level representation. 
While numerous and strong, economic complementarities among these five components do not 
tell the whole story, and section IV examines additional political complementarities.  
6For empirical evidence, we draw on a variety of sources, quantitative and qualitative. 
Our quantitative evidence is presented largely by means of descriptive statistics and simple 
correlations.1  For qualitative data and more micro-level analysis we rely on a range of dispersed 
country, industry, or firm-level studies, as well as personal interviews.  Some of the most 
detailed and penetrating empirical studies focus on Chile, in part because Chile is often held up 
as a model for other countries (Berg 2005, Haagh 2002a, and Sehnbruch 2006)
II.  Labor Markets in LMEs, CMEs, and Latin America
There has been some discussion of possible varieties or hybrids of capitalism in 
developing countries, but it has been fairly limited, inconclusive, and focused mostly on Asia 
(e.g., Amable 2003) and Eastern Europe (e.g., Feldman 2007; Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009).  So, 
we first want to establish empirically the distinctiveness of labor markets in Latin America, 
compared to LMEs and CMEs, and thereby establish the need for further elaboration of the 
‘varieties of capitalism’ framework for extension to developing countries.
Of course, the wide income disparities between developed countries and Latin America 
would lead us to expect differences in labor markets.  However, most of the differences would 
remain if we adjusted the comparison for levels of GDP per capita by comparing Latin America 
in recent decades with LMEs and CMEs in the mid 20th century when levels of GDP per capita in 
now developed countries were around what they are today in Latin America (Maddison 1983). 
CMEs and LMEs took distinctive shape in the early postwar period (Hall 2007).  By then levels 
1  Since our focus is on mutual causation and complementarities among different variables, regression analyses 
would suffer from problems of endogeneity and multi-collinearity  In this, we mirror the approach taken in Hall and 
Soskice (2001) and Estevez-Abe et al. (2001).  See the appendix for further discussion of the quantitative data.
7of union density were high in LMEs and CMEs (higher in most cases than in the 2000s), shop 
floor coordination existed in CMEs, basic patterns of labor market regulation were established, 
and the informal economies were not large (informality in 1960 in Western Europe was in the 
single digits, ranging from 0.4 to 5.9 percent (Schneider 1997: 43)).2  Moreover, by the end of 
the 20th century, the larger, richer countries of Latin America had completed the major 
modernizing transition from rural to urban societies and were well along in the post-industrial 
transition to service-based economies.  So there is less reason to expect that ongoing economic 
growth will automatically push labor market indicators for Latin America closer to the levels in 
developed countries.  The adjectives of ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ continue to give the false 
impression that poor countries are following similar development trajectories to those that rich 
countries traveled earlier.
The box-and-whiskers plots in figures 1.1 through 1.5 provide a first overview of how 
different labor markets in Latin America are from CMEs and LMEs on all five dimensions: 
informality and labor market regulation are higher than in CMEs and LMEs, job tenure, union 
density, and schooling are lower.3  Across the five dimensions, there is almost no overlap 
between the boxes for Latin America and those for CMEs and LMEs.  The box plots also show 
that Latin American countries are not only distinct from those in CMEs and LMEs, but also quite 
similar to each other: The boxes and whiskers for union density, job tenure, and labor market 
regulation are just as narrow as those for the established varieties of capitalism. While there is 
considerable variation in the degree of informality and average years of schooling among Latin 
2  Botero et al. (2004: 1364) find “no evidence that employment laws or collective [labor] relations laws vary with 
the level of economic development.”
3  In the box and whisker plots, the thick line shows the median for each group.  The box contains all cases between 
the 1st and the 3rd quartile.  The “whiskers” include all cases within another 1.5 quartile ranges.
8American countries, they still form a comparative cluster (with almost no overlap with the ranges 
for CMEs and LMEs).  Latin American labor markets – despite their important intra-regional 
differences – do appear to constitute a distinct variety, as the following discussions of each 
dimension spell out in greater detail. 
--- Figures 1.1-1.5 about here ---
1.  Labor Market Regulation.  Indices of regulation in Latin American labor market are 
very high in comparative terms (Figure 1.1).  Although not shown here, these indices are also 
higher than in other developing regions (the median for developing Asia is close to the median 
for LMEs).  Many countries in Latin America liberalized their labor legislations in the late 20th 
century in line with overall economic liberalization, yet these reforms were much more limited in 
extent than in other areas of the economy (Lora 2001).  Particular to Latin America is a strong 
reliance on severance pay as a means of employment protection (cf. Weller 2008).  The index on 
job-security by Botero et al. (2003) that we use does not weigh this heavily and may thus even 
understate the degree of regulation in Latin America. According to an index of dismissal costs 
developed by Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2000), regulation in every Latin American country is 
higher than in developed countries.4
4   Although reforms in labor markets were not as significant or extensive as market reforms in other areas, several 
countries, especially Chile, Peru, and Argentina, undertook major flexibilizing reforms (though these were partially 
reversed in Argentina in the late 1990s and early 2000s).  However, the Botero et al. index captures the state of 
regulation after most of these reforms.  Cook (2007: 56-7) classifies 31 protective and flexibilizing reforms in 18 
countries of Latin America from 1985 to 2004.  Of the flexibilizing reforms 15 of 18 happened before 1997 and 
would therefore be included in the Botero et al. indices.  These indices are based on formal laws and statutes and do 
not take into account variable levels of actual enforcement.  Although generally lax, partial evidence suggest that 
enforcement has been improving in some countries (Anner 2008, Piore and Schrank 2008).  See the data appendix 
for further analysis of the merits of alternative indices of regulation.  Our focus is on individual rather than 
92.  Labor Unions (Figure 1.2).  Despite considerable variation, most labor unions in Latin 
America are comparatively small, and most have been shrinking.  Rates of union density vary 
from 20-25 percent, in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, to 10-15 percent in Peru, Colombia, and 
Chile, to negligible rates in some of the smaller, poorer countries (IDB 2003: 233).  In a more 
qualitative vein, labor unions in Latin America are more politicized than their counterparts 
elsewhere (Murillo 2001: 197; Cook 1998: 314).  Earlier in the 20th century, unions in Latin 
America, as well as in most developed countries, focused their mobilization strategies heavily on 
the state and political parties.  However, unions in Europe retained a powerful organizational 
presence in the labor market and in many cases mobilized to bargain directly with strong 
employers’ associations.  Unions in Latin America had less autonomous organizational strength 
in labor markets, depended more on state and party leaders, and encountered fewer 
encompassing employers’ associations with whom they could bargain independently; “relatively 
few unions have the resources, the bargaining power, or the employer counterparts willing to 
engage in this kind of negotiation” (Cook 1998: 316).  Their focus has been on “political 
bargaining,” in contrast to the greater concentration on economic (wage) bargaining by unions in 
developed countries (Payne 1965, cf. Cook 1998).5
collective rights or union regulation.  The latter tends to vary more across Latin America than the former (Carnes 
2009: 4).
5For example, in pre-Chávez Venezuela, the four confederations of unions were closely tied with political parties, 
and “labor representatives used the clout of the major political parties to win favorable terms from management in 
contract negotiations.  Since 1984, in fact, the union confederations have focused on achieving blanket salary raises 
by government decree…, shifting their activity from negotiating with business to government lobbying” (Enright, 
Francés, and Saavedra 1996: 218-9).  Observers in Chile have criticized the CUT for focusing on traditional political 
and ethical concerns and attacking the neoliberal development model, rather than attending to more immediate, 
tractable worker concerns.  However, CUT is legally prohibited from collective bargaining which is completely 
decentralized to the firm level (Berg 2005: 50).
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In instances where unions in Latin America do negotiate employment contracts, the level 
of centralization varies greatly across countries and over time.  In Argentina, most contracts were 
by sector until 1993, then decentralized to the firm level for a decade, before re-centralizing at 
the sectoral level in the wake of the economic boom of the mid 2000s (Etchemendy and Collier 
2006).  In Mexico most, and in Chile all, contracts are negotiated at the firm level (Berg, et al. 
2006, 197-8; Haagh 2002b, 92).  However, despite this trend towards decentralized wage 
bargaining, union representation at the plant and shopfloor levels remains weak (Nelson  1991, 
42). 6
In sum, the general picture of bargaining in Latin America is of small, truncated unions, 
circumscribed in scope and confined to an intermediate, meso-level of bargaining with major 
political, organizational, and legal constraints on centralized bargaining and on decentralized 
representation.  Sympathetic governments may occasionally bolster union negotiators but in 
recent decades such support has rarely had lasting institutionalized consequences, especially on 
the shop floor.  The absence of plant level representation, and certainly anything formal like 
German-style works councils, is crucial in foreclosing possibilities for negotiations over skills 
and work organization that are more common in CMEs.
3.  Job Tenure.  By a variety of measures, job tenure is high in CMEs, low in LMEs, and 
even lower in Latin America.  The median tenure was 7.4 years in CMEs, 5 in LMEs, and only 3 
in Latin America (figure 1.3).  Mean tenure rates show similar differences and a declining trend. 
6  Measures of the proportion of workers covered by collective bargains are not available for most countries.  In 
Argentina coverage rose to 80-90 percent of workers in the mid 2000s (Etchemendy and Collier 2006).  In Chile, in 
contrast, coverage was less than 10 percent in the 1990s (Haagh 2002b: 92).  But even in Argentina unions are only 
weakly represented on the shopfloor.  In the comparatively well organized metal sector, less than 20 percent of the 
firms that are covered by the industrial level bargaining agreement have union delegates. (interview, UOM Córdoba, 
1 July 2009, see also Delfini and Picchetti 2007 35; Veiga and Martin 2009; 366). 
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Among major countries in Latin America, mean tenure in Argentina was 6.7 years in 2001 
(down from 7.1 years in 1992) and 5 years in Brazil.  In the wake of flexibilizing reforms in Peru 
in the 1990s, mean tenure fell by almost half from 5.8 years in 1991 to 3.3 years in 1999 (Cook 
2007: 125).  In contrast, mean tenure was 6.6 years in the United States in 1998, 12.2 years in 
Japan, and 10.7 years in Germany (Berg et al 2006: 38).  A 2004 survey of several hundred, 
mostly lower income workers in São Paulo found that the median duration of their last 
employment was only about 13 months and for nearly three quarters their last job lasted less than 
two years (Haagh 2007: 7).  The exceptionally high turnover in Latin America is rarely central in 
analyses of labor markets and labor politics, but deserves greater emphasis on its own as a 
defining feature of work in Latin America, and especially, as discussed later, in relation to skills, 
regulation, and union organizing.
4.  Informal economy (Figure 1.4).  Non-agricultural informal work has averaged more 
than 40 percent in the region for the past several decades (Pagés et al. 2009: 1).  The range is 
wide within Latin America (from 25 percent (Chile) to 65 percent (Peru) (IDB 2003: 210)) but 
still well above levels for CMEs and LMEs, both recently and historically, and somewhat higher 
than levels of informality in Asia.  The largest share of the informal economy is accounted for by 
self-employed workers, or workers in micro-enterprises with less than five workers, but even for 
firms with more than 100 workers, almost 20 percent of workers are not covered by social 
security and can thus be considered informal (IDB 2003: 211).  While large proportions of 
workers are in the informal sector, the division in Latin America is permeable, and studies based 
on household panels suggest that it does not create stark, dual labor markets (cf. Maloney 1997; 
IDB 2003; Berg et al. 2006).  Workers move rather frequently from informal to formal jobs, and 
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back again.  Although debate continues on how best to measure informality (see ILO 2006, Perry 
et al. 2007), all indicators show comparatively large and stable informal sectors in Latin 
America.
5.  Skills and education.  Not surprisingly, given the income disparities, general education 
levels in Latin America are much lower than in developed countries.  By the rough measure in 
Figure 1.5, the average years of schooling among the adult population is 5.7 years in Latin 
America, 9.9 years in CMEs, and 11 years in LMEs.  Controlling for income, educational 
attainment in Latin America is also comparatively low.  Overall, “Latin American adults have 
1.4 fewer years of education, and East Asian adults 0.4 years more than would be expected by 
their income levels” (de Ferranti et al. 2003: 3).  Moreover, Latin American governments invest 
little in training people once out of school:  median spending on vocational training for the 
unemployed is .04 percent of GDP, compared to .23 percent in LMEs and .52 percent in CMEs 
(calculated from IDB 2003: 282).  By another calculation, Venezuelan companies spent on 
average .2 percent of revenues on training, compared to 2 percent in Germany and 3 percent in 
Japan (Granell and Parra cited in Enright, Francés, and Saavedra 1996: 215).
In sum, in a descriptive sense labor markets in Latin America are distinct rather than a 
subvariety of either LMEs or CMEs.  Some trends in Latin America – falling union density or 
higher turnover – make them appear to be heading in an LME direction.  However, the 
convergence is partial and slow and not matched on dimensions like regulation and informality, 
so for the time being it does not seem appropriate to think of them as emerging LMEs.  A 
complete overview of labor markets in Latin America would explore in greater detail variations 
over time and across countries.  However, from a comparative perspective what stands out is the 
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relative absence of significant variation, compared both to other regions and other dimensions of 
change in the political economies of Latin America.  The decline of union density is one of the 
areas of greatest change, though this did not always imply a radical shift in the role of unions in 
labor markets because previously larger unions were often constrained by hostile and/or 
authoritarian government and many lacked routinized mechanisms for collective bargaining.
On the regulation dimension, one comprehensive study of the labor reforms between 
1990 and the mid 2000s documents reforms in 11 of the 17 countries in Latin America, but finds 
surprisingly little change in the standard labor contract (Vega Ruíz 2005: 12).  Other authors 
studying Latin American labor reforms have argued that “[e]arly laws have proved particularly 
stable over time” (Carnes 2009, cf. also Cook 2007).   ILO estimates point to an increasing 
informalization in Latin American through the mid 2000s, but even in the period between 1950 
and 1980, 4 out of every 10 jobs created were in the informal economy (Tokman 2001: 13).  Low 
skill levels and a lack of training have been a well known issue in Latin America for decades, 
and, while schooling has improved somewhat, Latin America's relative position in the worldwide 
skill distribution has not.  Evidence on turnover prior to the 1990s is scarce, but most partial data 
suggest that turnover was high (see for example Humphrey 1982).
This review of the five core features of labor markets focuses on the average tendencies 
in Latin America.  The point is not that the countries of the region are all the same, but rather that 
labor market indices cluster in ways that justify classifying them as different from labor markets 
elsewhere.7  For other purposes, further disaggregation would be necessary, and one might want 
7   Comparable data are not available on job tenure, but partial data (from the sources listed in the data appendix) on 
developing countries in Asia show similar average levels of schooling and informality to Latin America, but lower 
levels of union density, and much lower levels of regulation (lower than CMEs and on par with LMEs).
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to separate out groups of smaller, poorer countries in Central America and the Andean region 
where countries tend to have lower union density, lower education levels, and larger informal 
sectors than larger, richer countries in South America.  And, for the most part, the qualitative 
evidence for this paper is drawn from this latter group.  These variations notwithstanding, it is 
still useful to distinguish average trends in Latin America as a whole.  
Moreover, beyond descriptive characteristics, there is a further case that most labor 
markets in Latin America belong to a separate variety because, as we spell out in the next 
section, the interactions among these labor market features generate distinct complementarities 
and reinforcing dynamics.
III.  Complementarities in Labor Markets in Latin America
To understand the interactions among major components of labor markets in Latin 
America we extend the concept of complementarities by adding in negative complementarities to 
the traditional positive connotations and by adding – in Section IV  - the notion of political  
complementarities to the economic complementarities considered in this section.  Hall and 
Soskice consider two institutions complementary “if the presence (or efficiency) of one increases 
the returns from (or efficiency) of the other." (2001: 17).  In labor markets in Latin America, 
there are also instances of mutually reinforcing inefficiencies. These negative complementarities 
are akin to market failure and multiple equilibria in economic theory: Under some conditions, 
utility maximizing agents will behave in a way that leads to a pareto inefficient outcome. One of 
the better known examples of this is the “low skills, bad jobs” trap, in which firms in countries 
with a large unskilled workforce “have little incentives to provide good jobs (requiring high 
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skills and providing high wages), and if few good jobs are available, workers have little incentive 
to acquire skills.” (Snower 1994: 1, see also Jackson and Deeg 2006: 12 on negative 
complementarities).
Figure 2 sketches out economic complementarities and compatibilities among five core 
components of labor markets in Latin America.  Complementarities structure contemporary 
incentives for sustaining the status quo (and as such constitute a constant cause type of path 
dependency (Mahoney 2000)), but are not necessarily part of the explanation of the historical 
causes or origins of these labor market institutions.  Following historical institutionalism, in 
order to understand the origins of institutions we cannot look at their current function but “we 
have to go back and look” (Pierson 2000: 264).  Existing historical studies are mostly concerned 
with labor regulation.  Some suggest that the complementarities we identify, between labor 
unions, skill regime, and labor regulation were important in the creation of labor regimes (Carnes 
2009).  Other researchers emphasize more contingent historical factors, most importantly the 
history of labor incorporation (Collier and Collier 1991, Cook 2007).  Research on the historical 
origins of informality and tenure in Latin America is much scarcer.  Our focus however is on the 
contemporary incentives for continuity rather than deeper historical causes.
--- Figure 2.  Economic Complementarities ---
Labor Unions.  The characteristics of Latin American labor unions – low density, 
strength in political bargaining, weakness in economic bargaining, and a lack of shop floor 
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organization – reinforce several other labor market features.  The weakness of unions, both 
nationally and on the shop floor, reinforces the low skill equilibrium by impeding closer 
employer-union cooperation in skill upgrading.  In earlier industrializers, unions were crucial in 
establishing vocational training systems (Thelen 2004), and later in enhancing the quality and 
quantity of training (Sehnbruch 2006: 208).  In CMEs, the most successful vocational training 
systems are, in fact, administered jointly by unions and employers.
In Latin America, systems of vocational education often provide for representation by 
labor unions on the national, local, and sometimes firm-level boards and committees responsible 
for planning training programs (IDB 2001: 139-40).  But these boards are often pro-forma 
councils charged with overseeing state-mandated spending, and most are distant from the 
shopfloor (Ducci 2001: 272).  In Chile firms receive tax benefits for training workers, and even 
greater benefits if the training program is endorsed by a worker-management committee.  Yet 
only five percent of the firms that provide training establish such committees (Sehnbruch 2006: 
185).  In addition, the Chilean government created in 1988 an apprenticeship program financed 
through large tax deductions.  The government expected the program would train 10,000 
workers, but companies hired only about 500, in part because neither unions nor business 
associations were involved in designing or implementing the program (Sehnbruch 2006: 179). 
As noted above, Chilean labor law forbids unions from bargaining over non-wage issues.
The character of unions and generalized antagonism between unions and management 
may also contribute to low levels of job tenure.  In the absence of important coordinating 
functions (as for example over training), “[e]mployers throughout the region have preferred the 
unilateral imposition of workplace changes” (Cook 1998: 316).  From the union side, the absence 
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of local opportunities for negotiation encourages a more national and militant orientation.  The 
mutual disengagement at the firm and plant level creates a climate of distrust between unions and 
employers, and gives employers stronger incentives to accelerate turnover to foreclose 
possibilities of more vigorous union organizing on the shop floor.8
The IDB examined several surveys and concluded that industrial relations were “far from 
optimal” in the larger countries of Latin America.. Among 47 countries surveyed, six Latin 
American countries mostly fell toward the bottom half, some near the bottom, of rankings by 
employers on whether industrial relations were more productive or hostile.  Employees took an 
even dimmer view.  Asked whether employers were honest, worker responses ranges from a high 
of only 25 percent in Mexico to a low of less than five percent in Argentina.  Positive responses 
were similarly low to the answer of whether employees thought overall relations with employers 
were good (IDB 2001: 135-6).
Informal Economy.  A large pool of informal workers facilitates high turnover rates in 
Latin America.  From a firm’s point of view, the ‘reserve army’ of informal workers facilitates 
quick replacement of laid-off workers. Maloney does find evidence of “queuing” for formal jobs, 
i.e. there are several informal workers waiting to fill any opening for a formal job (1997: 20). 
The fact that mainly salaried workers are queuing may even suggest that firms are able to fill 
vacant positions with employees already working in comparable (albeit informal) jobs.  In 
general there is a relatively large flow of informal workers into formal jobs – and back.  Over a 
8  In Chile, increasingly common temporary employment contracts legally prohibit workers from joining unions 
(Berg 2005: 55).  In his account of Brazilian auto-workers, Humphrey describes how employers used regular lay-
offs – regardless of skill level or seniority – to control workers (1982: 118-121; 161f). 
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six month period the flow was about 10 percent of all workers in either direction in Argentina 
and 15 percent in Mexico (IDB 2003: 68f.; 76).
Additionally, high levels of informal work, especially in the form of self-employment and 
tiny firms, have a detrimental effect on the skill regimes.  As these microenterprises are 
characterized by “poor capitalization and backward technology” (Portes et al. 1989: 300), they 
become part of the “low skill trap”, where returns are low for additional training.  The 
availability of employment opportunities in the informal sector, some of them well paid, lowers 
incentives for students to stay in school or for workers to invest more in skills.  If we expand the 
concept of the informal sector across borders, then the option of high wage, unskilled 
employment in a foreign informal sector (as for undocumented workers in the United States) 
further reduces incentives for training and formal schooling.  Conversely, improving labor law 
enforcement – and thereby reducing informality – can enhance skill levels (Schrank 2006 and 
Almeida and Aterido 2008).
Short Job Tenure.  The short average duration of job tenure in Latin America also 
undermines incentives to invest in education and training.  In Peru, for example, high and 
increasing turnover in the 1990s, “had negative consequences for training and productivity” 
(Cook 2007: 125).  More generally, the IDB concluded that “temporary contracts also seem to 
have negative effects on the accumulation of human capital” (2003: 220).  Investments in 
specific skills are especially unlikely if both workers and employers face high risks of losing 
their investment (Estevez Abe et al. 2001).9
9   In Venezuela, high turnover, fueled in part, as noted above, by the high cost of severance payments, “discourages 
firms from hiring people for the long-term, promoting them to higher levels of responsibility, or investing in their 
training or education.  Managers of firms that place a high value on human resource training confided in interviews 
that they have to struggle against these very real disincentives” (Enright, Francés, and Saavedra 1996: 205, see also 
215).
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For example, in Chile, though workers may receive some initial induction training in 
their first months on the job, training is generally more common for workers with longer tenure 
(Sehnbruch 2006: 191, 193).  Moreover, not only do workers change jobs frequently, they also 
move among very different kinds of jobs.  Among Chilean workers who changed jobs in the late 
1990s, around half moved from industry, commerce, construction, or services into one of the 
other three sectors (Sehnbruch 2006: 128).  In short, workers had little reason to expect that 
training in one job would be useful for the next.
Short job tenure also complicates union organizing, especially on the shopfloor.  For the 
median worker whose expected job tenure is three years, there is little incentive to spend time 
and money to get organized. More generally, a range of comparative evidence finds a positive 
relationship between higher tenure and greater organization.  In the United Kingdom, for 
example, long tenure is strongly associated with union membership (Gottfried 1992: 108).  In 
Brazil, the auto-worker strikes in the late 1970s were initiated by toolmakers who had much 
longer average times of employment (Humphrey 1982: 161f).  More generally in Latin America, 
workers in the public sector have disproportionally high unionization rates and much higher job 
stability and tenure (Marceira and Murillo 2001: 9).
Finally, high turnover rates are also positively associated with the size of the informal 
economy. As unemployment benefits are very low or altogether absent in Latin American 
economies, workers cannot afford to remain unemployed during extended periods of job search 
(IDB 2003: 65).  As a consequence the informal labor market serves as a highly flexible buffer. 
In Argentina, more than eight out of ten unemployed workers who find work start working an 
informal job; in Mexico the equivalent number is six out of ten. (ibid. 73f.).  High turnover and 
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economic insecurity thus make the informal sector an important temporary source of 
employment for Latin American workers and contribute to its large size.
Labor Market Regulation.  Most economists agree that highly regulated labor markets 
promote larger informal economies (Schneider 2005, Loayza et al. 2005,  IDB 2003: 208, World 
Bank 2004a: 136, 148).10  The logic of this complementarity is simple:  as labor regulations 
increase, the “opportunity costs” of formal employment (compared to informal employment) 
rise.  In a context of weak enforcement, the costs for firms to remain completely or partially 
informal may be much lower than the costs of formal compliance.  A World Bank study 
concluded that, “cross-country studies show that a reduction of the employment regulation index 
by a third is associated with a 14-percentage-point decline in informal employment and a 6.7-
percentage-point fall in output produced in the informal economy” (2004b: 37).
One of the key arguments in the varieties of capitalism literature on advanced 
industrialized countries concerns the stability of employment.  Political institutions in CMEs 
promote employment stability and thus foster the investment in specific skills by both firms and 
workers. As figure 3 shows, there is indeed a positive relationship (.61) between employment 
regulation and job tenure in advanced industrialized countries.  In the same graph, we can see, 
however, that the correlation in Latin America runs the opposite way:  employment regulation 
actually has a negative relationship (-.52) with median job tenure. 
--- Figure 3.  Job Tenure and Employment Protection ---
10   Our interest here is in how contemporary regulation affects incentives for informal employment.  This is not to 
say that regulation is the main cause of informality nor that deregulation is the best means for reducing informality. 
Historically, several other causes, including levels of enforcement, contributed to the emergence of contemporary 
patterns of informality.  For an update on these debates, see Berg et al. 2006, Anner 2008, and Piore and Schrank 
2008.
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High levels of labor regulation can lower job tenure in the formal sector in several ways. 
Dismissed workers are entitled in most countries to severance payments (Cook 2007: 48).  As 
severance payments generally increase with length of service (IDB 2003: 58), employers have 
incentives to keep average tenure short.  According to an overview of the Venezuelan labor 
market in the 1990s, severance provisions “make it costlier to keep workers on payroll for 
extended periods than to dismiss them and hire new workers.  For more firms, it is cheaper to fire 
workers and to replace them than to promote them, since each increase in salary inflates the final 
payment to be made on their leaving the firm” (Enright, Francés, and Saavedra 1996: 205). 11  In 
addition, according to a report from McKinsey, “companies try to get around such laws [on 
severance pay and employment security] by employing temporary workers and then firing them 
just before they would have the right to become permanent (2007: xx).12
Low Skills.  Lastly, low skill levels should, in principle, also facilitate (or reduce the cost 
to employers of) high turnover, because unskilled workers are easier to replace than skilled 
workers.  On average the median time to fill an unskilled vacancy in Latin America is just over 
one week, compared to just under three weeks to fill a vacancy for a skilled position (Pagés et al. 
2009: 106).  Surveys of workers in the 1990s showed that unskilled workers in Mexico were 
11   Many labor reforms in Latin America included provisions to make temporary and non-standard contracts more 
readily available, and employers in most countries, but especially Peru, Chile, and Argentina, have made wide use of 
them.  Temporary contracts are one of the components in the Botero et al index.
12   High severance pay also creates a partial complementarity with low skill levels available in the labor market.  For 
the minority of workers who have long tenure, their right to accumulated severance pay makes it costly for them to 
leave voluntarily to move to another firm.  This in turn reduces the poaching problem for employers who therefore 
have incentives to invest more in training their long-term workers, which in turn reduces the demand for skilled 
workers in the labor market.
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twice as likely as skilled workers, and in Argentina over 50 percent more likely, to transition 
from employment to unemployment or inactivity (IDB 2003: 76).13  And, the connection between 
low skills and turnover is not just among small and medium, lower technology firms; in Camargo 
Correa, one of the largest private firms in Brazil, more than half the workers have only a primary 
education or less, and median tenure is close to two years (Relatorio Anual 2004: 4).
The goal of this section was to illustrate the wide range of complementarities among the 
five core components where institutionalized patterns of behavior in one realm of the labor 
market affects the incentives of employers and workers in other realms.  The intensity of these 
complementarities is variable as are the precise mechanisms which link the realms together, but 
the overall conclusion is that it makes little sense to analyze these components in isolation. 
Moreover, there are other complementarities, to which we now turn, that are mediated by 
politics.
IV.  Politics and Complementarities with Other Institutions
In Latin American political systems and states structure incentives in ways that form an 
important part of the complementary interactions of economic institutions.  Two institutions may 
not only be complementary because they reinforce each others’ economic performance, but also 
if their joint existence reinforces their political resiliency.  We define a complementary 
relationship as ‘political’ if it is intermediated by the state or political system (e.g. union pressure 
13Other surveys of workers in Argentina and Brazil show a more mixed picture (Berg et al. 2006: 39).  In Argentina 
skilled workers in 1992 had somewhat shorter tenure, though by 2001 they had slightly longer tenure than unskilled 
workers.  In Brazil, in contrast, skilled workers had longer tenure in 1992 but roughly the same as unskilled workers 
by 1999.
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for labor regulation) or if it affects the incentives for, or ability of, actors to mobilize for political 
goals (e.g. the difficulties a large informal economy poses for union organization).  Figure 4 
illustrates these complementarities graphically with the dark lines (political) superimposed on the 
fainter lines of the economic complementarities in Figure 2.  The overall picture is one of tighter 
integration among the five components.
--- Figure 4.  Economic and political complementarities ---
Labor Unions.  Unions have the strongest and best documented effect on continuities in 
labor market regulation (IDB 2003: 219).  These effects largely conform to expectations of 
approaches that emphasize feedback loops, path dependence, and insider/outsider cleavages 
(Rueda 2005, Carnes 2009).  Lacking leverage in direct negotiations with employers, unions 
invested heavily in ties to states and political parties (Buchanan 1995).  Extensive protective 
labor codes in most Latin American countries date back to the 1930s or 1940s, and unions have 
recently campaigned less to obtain new rights and more to safeguard old benefits, especially 
collective rights.  This political focus has often been effective even during periods of broad 
liberalization (Murillo and Schrank 2005, Cook 2007).
The absence of well organized unions in many workplaces contributes to another political 
or state-mediated complementarity:  without strong unions, labor inspections are less likely to 
occur and enforcement is less likely to be effective, thereby increasing informality.  As Mark 
Anner points out, “active and well-informed labor unions are one of the best mechanisms to 
ensure vigilance of labor standards at the workplace” (2008: 43).   Without the support of 
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engaged and well organized involved labor unions, inspectors can only cover a small fraction of 
labor law infractions (Amengual 2010).14
Informality.  Latin America’s large informal sectors pose a major problem for labor 
unions, as informal workers are almost impossible to organize.  Large informal sectors of Latin 
American economies thus reinforce the small size of unions and encourage them to focus on the 
narrow ‘insider’ interests of workers in the formal sector.  While the frequent movement of 
workers between the formal and informal sectors attenuates the insider/outsider cleavage, the 
segmentation of the labor market nonetheless restricts the scope of union organizing and the 
range of interests unions might represent.  The incentives in this political complementarity are 
straightforward:  the existence of a large informal sector reduces the returns for labor leaders 
from investing in extensive and solidaristic organizing.
The possibility of using flexible, informal employment also mutes business opposition to 
high levels of regulation, especially in contexts where business fears a highly charged political 
backlash (interview with an ex-president of the American Chamber of Commerce, Santiago, 
Chile, March 2007).  Although business people generally favor reducing regulation (especially in 
interviews and surveys, e.g. IDB 2001: 113, World Bank 2004a: 136), the options for less 
regulated, informal employment, both within the firm and through subcontractors, reduces the 
total cost of regulation and thereby the incentives for open political mobilization by employers to 
push reform (Cook 2007: 9, 46).  Moreover, weak enforcement often means that workers in the 
formal sector do not receive the benefits regulations entitle them to (cf. Bensusán  2006). There 
also appears to be considerable political discretion in enforcement and governments can adjust 
14   See Piore and Schrank (2008) and Schrank (2009) on the overall politics of labor law enforcement.
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enforcement to economic circumstances:  when the Chilean construction sector suffered from the 
economic crisis between 1998-2004, inspections became less frequent and were usually 
announced beforehand (ibid. 274).
This may also help to understand the increase of informality during the 1990s (cf. 
Tokman 2001), in spite of the (somewhat) more flexible labor law regime, which would seem to 
contradict the relationship between labor law and informality we stipulate in section III above. 
As firms faced increasing pressure from globalization, lax enforcement of labor law provided a 
welcome source of flexibility. The trend was exacerbated by a shrinking and embattled union 
movement, which, as outlined above, led to even less effective enforcement. 
Scattered evidence suggests that MNCs are more heavily regulated or more likely to 
comply with regulations than domestic firms, especially smaller firms (e.g., Sehnbruch 2006: 7, 
World Bank 2004a: 100).  This disparity further reinforces the status quo politically and weakens 
a potential de-regulation coalition between MNCs and domestic firms.  First, MNCs usually shy 
away from high visibility engagement in domestic politics, especially on high voltage issues like 
labor rights (see Schneider 2004).  Second, domestic firms that compete with MNCs and that pay 
less than the full cost of regulation have few incentives to press for deregulation that could level 
the playing field and reduce their competitive advantages. 
Short Job Tenure.  High worker turnover works in a similar way to reduce the costs of 
regulation and thereby the incentives for employers to invest in campaigning politically to 
reform them.  Worker benefits often accumulate with longer periods of employment, so 
employers can reduce average costs by laying workers off after a few years.  Moreover, workers 
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who circulate rapidly through many jobs are less likely to press past employers for benefits 
delayed or denied.  In Chile employers frequently deny severance benefits to employees, and 
workers face long delays, high costs, and uncertain judgments if they opt to take their cases to 
the labor tribunals (Sehnbruch 2006: 138).  A survey in 1992 of labor leaders in 302 firms in 
Chile revealed that in two thirds of potentially actionable infractions on severance pay, no case 
was taken to the labor courts (Haagh 2002a: 105).
Low Skill Level.  Historical and comparative analyses provide grounds for expecting that 
low skill levels contribute to union weakness, especially on the shopfloor.  In early 
industrializers, skilled workers were at the vanguard of early union organizing.  There was a 
“striking similarity” across Europe that “printers, machine workers, and construction workers 
were at the core of early, stable union organizations, while unskilled workers were hard to 
organize” (Fischer 1985: 81, our translation).  Even today, low-skill workers (defined as those 
without an upper secondary education) are less likely to be union members in almost all 
countries (Schnabel and Wagner 2007).   The same pattern holds in Latin America, where 
workers without a high-school diploma are less likely to be unionized (IDB 2003: 231).
In sum, this brief review of political incentives for major protagonists in labor markets – 
workers, union leaders, and employers – yields another layer of political complementarities that 
generally reinforce continuities in the economic complementarities analysed in Section III. 
Beyond the straightforward interests of unions in bolstering labor regulation, the other political 
complementarities work in the direction of reducing or constraining impulses for change by 
actors who would gain from reform.  So, for example, union leaders might seek to expand 
membership, but cannot organize workers in the huge informal sector.  Employers might gain 
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from deregulation, but informal employment and high turnover reduce the costs of regulation and 
weaken the reform impulse.  Thus the absence of stronger incentives for employers and the 
absence for unions of new groups to organize, either skilled workers or more formal sector 
workers, favor the status quo.
V.  Conclusions
Our analysis emphasizes the complementarities and compatibilities that reinforce 
continuity and help explain the lack of significant improvement in labor markets in recent 
decades.  Throughout much of the late 20th century, labor markets in Latin America were 
characterized by large informal sectors, low skills, politicized unions (that were weak on the 
shopfloor and in collective bargaining), extensive regulation, and high turnover.  Previous 
studies have offered explanations for persistence in each of these areas, however, our argument is 
that individual continuities cannot be fully understood without factoring in the multiple 
economic and political complementarities that reinforce continuity and raise obstacles to change.
Our analysis of interactions and complementarities has several practical implications, 
especially for the design and implementation of common policies intended to raise skills or 
reduce informality.  For example, efforts to crack down on informality are more likely to prosper 
if accompanied by complementary policies intended to redress problems in regulation that 
provided incentives to go off the books in the first place (by for example shifting from severance 
pay to unemployment insurance).  On skills, proposals to improve education and vocational 
training focus mostly on the supply side:  expand secondary education, improve educational 
quality, give students incentives to stay in school, increase funding for vocational training, etc. 
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However, the benefits of such efforts are not likely to be fully realized in the absence of 
complementary policies to improve the demand side – expansion of opportunities for long term 
employment in higher skill jobs.  If workers expect that they will work much of their career in 
the informal sector or have only short tenure jobs in a variety of different formal sector jobs, then 
they have few incentives to invest in skills, regardless of how good the supply of educational 
alternatives becomes.
Our primary focus has been on continuity, but this is not meant to imply that change is 
impossible.  In fact, change has been significant on some dimensions and could accelerate in the 
future.  Most of these changes are in the direction of LMEs:  some de-regulation, weakening of 
unions, and the expansion of the service sector.  In a more speculative vein, the expansion of 
higher skill and higher wage service employment might offer one possible escape, at least for 
some workers, from a low skill equilibrium, because employment in many service jobs offers the 
possibility of incremental investment in general skills (for example, evening classes in software 
and business management).  The implication for policy would be to shift resources from 
vocational training in specific skills to programs in general skills (along the lines community 
colleges in the United States) (Finegold and Soskice 1988; Castro and Garcia 2003).
One of the broader theoretical goals of our analysis is the identification of a new variety 
of labor market with its own distinctive complementarities.  If the complementarities in Latin 
American labor markets differ from those in other varieties, and if these complementarities and 
other pressures are not pushing labor markets in Latin America toward either LMEs or CMEs, 
then a plausible case can be made that Latin American economies belong to a distinct variety of 
capitalism.  The debate on varieties of capitalism has had a profound influence on research in 
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political economy in developed countries.  However, the approach can not be fruitfully shifted to 
examine developing countries without a great deal of groundwork to identify comparable sets of 
institutional foundations and differing sorts of complementary interactions.
Our overview analysis necessarily omitted more detailed consideration of variations 
within Latin America.  The hope is that our contribution as “lumpers” provides a useful 
framework in which to engage in “splitting.”  In the overall picture of labor markets in Latin 
America, the chances for rapid improvement may look bleak, but studies of successful 
divergence from the patterns we identify can shed important light on possible ways out of the 
various negative complementarities. Some cases of interesting divergence could include the 
impact of the Intel investment in Costa Rica, which may single-handedly have changed the 
demand side of the “low skill” trap.  Or, the dramatic increase in tertiary education in Chile 
might lead the economy toward a promising LME path that relies primarily on high general 
skills.  However, the promise of, and obstacles to, the consolidation of these exceptional cases 
can best be analyzed within the sort of framework of interlocking complementarities proposed 
here.
Another contribution we hope to make to the debate on varieties of capitalism is a fuller, 
though perhaps more complex, incorporation of politics and the state.  Hall and Soskice’s 
original framework is often criticized for its neglect of politics.  Others have subsequently 
brought more politics in by incorporating coalitions, parties, and state actors in most cases to 
show how these actors adopted policies that actively and deliberately reinforced or shored up 
core positive complementarities, as in Germany among high skills, long tenure, and employer 
coordination (Thelen 2004, Iverson and Soskice 2007, Hancke et al. 2007).  Part of the political 
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story in Latin America is similar, as for example when unions engage in politics to maintain 
labor market regulations.  However, there is an additional, crucial, more passive side where 
complementarities in labor markets work to impede the emergence of potential coalitions for 
change and thereby contribute to reinforcing current, sometimes negative trends.
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Data Appendix
Despite the enormous amount of quantitative data on labor markets in Latin America, finding the 
best measures the five core components – union presence, informal employment, skills, job 
tenure, and regulation – required extensive searching and sifting to settle on the sources listed 
below in appendix table 1 and used in the figures in the text.
Data on union density (unionized workers as percentage of total labor force) for Latin 
America are from Forteza and Rama (2002) for the period between 1991 and 1995 as cited in 
IDB (2003) and for LMEs and CMEs from OECD (2010) for 1995.  Unfortunately there are no 
more recent data on union density for a broad set of Latin American countries.  Current data for 
the OECD as well as Mexico and Chile show comparable downward trends: Between 1991 and 
2005 union  density in Mexico fell from 24.3 to 18.3 percent and in Chile from 21.2 to 15.1 
percent – this decline by about 25% is comparable to the old OECD countries, where unions 
have declined more steeply in some cases (e.g. union density in Germany falling from 36 to 21.6 
percent; in Australia from 39.6 to 22.1 percent over the same period) and have been more stable 
in others (most notably the Scandinavian countries, where numbers have changed little).(OECD 
2010).
Beyond OECD countries, data on union density must be used with caution. Union density 
is conventionally measured as the number of union members divided by the total number of 
employees: But who exactly counts as an employee? In order to account for the large proportion 
of workers in the informal labor market, union density for Latin American (and other less 
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developed) countries is commonly calculated as a percentage of the non-agricultural labor force 
(Lawrence and Ishikawa 2005).  These types of decisions make the data hard to compare across 
countries.  There are two different sets of data for labor covering most Latin American countries: 
the data prepared by Fortaleza and Rama at the World Bank and data from the 1997/1998 World  
Labour Report compiled by the ILO (1997), both for 1995.  We use the former because it was 
designed for comparative analysis.  Although the absolute values differ somewhat between the 
two, (the ILO numbers are slightly higher), both the general magnitude and the rank order of 
countries is the same.
Our measure of labor market regulation is taken from the Employment Law Index created 
by Botero et al. (2003) and averages the scores on three sub-categories:  alternative employment 
contracts, firing costs, and dismissal protections.  For comparative analysis, it is important to 
combine multiple measures of employment regulation because modes of employment protection 
vary widely across countries.  Using single dimensions can give a distorted picture.  Firing costs, 
for example, tend to be especially high in Latin American countries, which biases the index by 
Heckman and Pagés-Serra (2000).  We use the data working paper version of Botero et al. (2003) 
instead of the index in the later published version (Botero et al.  2004) which includes a fourth 
category of measuring regulation of overtime.   Regulating overtime does not add much to the 
index, because it is less significant than regulating terms of hiring and firing in the first place.  In 
any case, the two indicators are largely similar for most countries and would not alter much the 
average comparisons we make.  
A key advantage of the Botero et al. index is that it measures codified regulation only and 
is thus relatively objective and comparable across countries.  Indices such as those in Forteza and 
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Rama (2006) which attempt to measure 'real' labor market rigidity introduce possible error by 
including non-regulatory dimensions such as the strength of labor unions and the size of 
government employment.   In any case, an exclusive focus on formal regulation is more 
appropriate for our analysis.  While the data by Botero et al. do not have a time-series 
component, the collection of labor law changes in Latin America compiled by Vega Ruiz (2005) 
demonstrates that labor law changes have been limited, but more significant than in the OECD, 
where they have been largely untouched (OECD 1999).  So, while high levels of labor market 
regulation have been a continuous feature of Latin American labor markets, there may have been 
some convergence in the 2000s toward CME levels.
On job tenure, the data for Latin America are from IDB (2003, appendix), based on 
household panels and labor force surveys, with additional data for Mexico from Calderón-
Madrid (2000) and for Colombia from Schaffner (2001)). For CMEs and LMEs we take the data 
from Estevez-Abe et al. (2001: 170), using OECD data from the mid-1990s. Unfortunately, most 
published data on job-tenure gives average rather than median values. But whereas average job 
tenure is skewed heavily both by very short job stints and by workers holding jobs for forty and 
more years, median job tenure depicts the duration of tenure for an average worker. We thus 
strongly prefer it as a measure.  Nonetheless, for purposes of comparison, the relative rankings of 
countries and regions are the same using either median or mean measures.  Average job tenure 
(see appendix table 1) was 10.57 in CMEs, 8.39 in LMEs, and 6.1 in Latin America (data for 
CMEs and LMEs for 2003 from OECD 2010 – data for Japan and the United States for 2003 
from earlier versions of the OECD labor force statistics; for Latin America from IDB 2003 for 
1999/2000, Chile for 1996).
34
Measures of the informal economy are from Schneider (2005), who uses a currency 
demand model based on the idea that most transactions in the informal economy take place in 
cash.  Schneider then uses a type of factor analysis (multiple indicator –multiple cause model) 
that treats the size of the informal economy (as percentage of GDP) as an unknown variable to 
estimate its change over time. This method is far from perfect, but Schneider has created the only 
comprehensive set of cross-country data on the informal economy.  For some countries in Latin 
America we do have data based on household panels, measuring the percentage of workers 
without social security coverage, a useful proxy for the informal sector (cf. IDB 2003: 166). 
Unfortunately these data are only available for a limited number of countries and, as the 
respective surveys are not identical, problematic for comparative usage.
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Argentina 4 6.7 21.5 25.4 8.49 1.55
Bolivia 4 7 16.4 67.1 5.54 1.82
Brazil 3 5.3 24.8 39.8 4.56 2.4
Chile 2.6 5.4 13.1 19.8 7.89 1.56
Colombia 1.9 4.3 12.1 39.1 5.01 1.99
Costa Rica 15 26.2 6.01
Ecuador 13.5 34.4 6.52 1.86
El Salvador 15 4.5
Guatemala 4.4 51.5 3.12
Honduras 1 3.7 20 49.6 4.08
Mexico 3.5 6.5 22.4 30.1 6.73 2.01
Nicaragua 2 5.2 23.4 45.2 4.42
Panama 3 6.7 14.2 64.1 7.9 2.38
Paraguay 5 7.5 2.8 5.74
Peru 3 6.6 12.9 59.9 7.33 1.67
Uruguay 4 7.8 16.3 51.1 7.25 1.02
Venezuela 2 5.1 18 33.6 5.61 2.32
CMEs
Austria 6.9 11.36 41.1 10.8 8.8 0.8
Belgium 8.4 12.12 55.7 21.5 8.73 1.77
Denmark 4.4 9.01 77 17.5 10.09 0.95
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Finland 7.8 10.59 80.4 17.6 10.14 1.73
Germany 10.7 11.01 29.2 16.8 9.75 1.57
Japan 8.3 11.6 24 11 9.72 1.42
Netherlands 5.5 10.35 25.7 12.8 9.24 1.68
Norway 6.5 9.69 57.3 18.7 11.86 1.29
Sweden 7.8 11.35 83.1 18.7 11.36 1.05
Switzerland 6 9.78 22.9 9.5 10.39 1.28
LMEs
Australia 3.4 32.4 13.8 10.57 0.92
Canada 5.9 32.2 15.4 11.43 1.22
Ireland 5.3 10.17 45.1 15.5 9.02 1.04
New Zealand 27.1 12.4 11.52 1.06
United 
Kingdom 5 8.78 32.7 12.3 9.35 1.02
United States 4.2 6.6 14.3 8.6 12.25 0.92
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Figure 3: The Relationship between Job Tenure and Labor Market  
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